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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MANAGING MEDICAID

ISAAC D. BUCK*
ABSTRACT
In a steady but rapid march, managed care has come to Medicaid.
Privatization has undoubtedly rebuilt the Medicaid landscape across America
over the last three decades. Now, as managed care programs administer health
care to three-in-four Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide, whether or not
managed care is adequately managing America’s largest public insurance
program has become an increasingly important question.
Of particular note have been states’ difficulties in constructing and
organizing the bidding and selection processes of the private companies tasked
with overseeing the administration of private Medicaid plans. Legal challenges
to various states’ bid procurement processes have been well documented. These
conflicts, exacerbated by ballooning state budgets and sharply competitive
carriers—and coupled with a dose of political tumult and palace intrigue—have
raised the temperature of states’ move to privatization. As a result, states’
approaches to, and results from, privatization have not been uniform.
In short, this article summarizes the current landscape of Medicaid
managed care. It provides background on the program and catalogs its costs,
growth, evolution, and recent relevant regulatory changes. It provides vignettes
of various states’ experiences, including those that demonstrate the benefits of
managed care, those that are hesitant to move fully towards privatization, and
those that have run into legal challenges as they have tried to give the keys of
their programs over to private actors. Finally, cost and access challenges are
mentioned in an effort to highlight the ongoing dangers threatening
privatization’s widespread adoption into the future. Ultimately, this article seeks
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to highlight the importance of Medicaid managed care during a time of vexing
uncertainty in American health care law and policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Managed care is on the march. States across America are privatizing their
Medicaid programs in efforts to gain predictability and cost control. In many of
these states across the country, Medicaid managed care is considered a shining
example of the power of the private market to save taxpayers millions of
dollars. 1 As a result, millions of Medicaid enrollees now get their health care
administered by private companies, continuing an accelerating trend that began
a generation ago.
But there is another side to Medicaid managed care. In Iowa, the Des Moines
Register calls the state’s recent private plan adoption a “nightmare” for
providers 2 and the “worst prank ever.” 3 In Florida, it has been referred to as a
“mess” that is “costing money rather than saving money.” 4 And in Illinois, the
rollout of the Medicaid managed care plan in the central part of the state has
been alleged to be both “bungled” and “really bad for consumers.” 5
Medicaid managed care, hampered by its complexity and amplified by the
pervasively uncertain future of the entire program of Medicaid itself, 6 begs for
1. See Kristen Schorsch, Big Savings. Painful Lessons. In Medicaid Revamp, Rauner Tries
to Learn from Other States, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/
article/20170303/ISSUE01/170309924/big-savings-painful-lessons-in-medicaid-revamp-raunertries-to-learn-from-other-states (last visited Sept.11, 2017).
2. Editorial: Providers’ Medicaid Nightmare Becomes Reality, DES MOINES REG. (July 16,
2016, 9:03 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/07/16/editorialproviders-medicaid-nightmare-becomes-reality/87023948/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
3. Editorial: Privatized Medicaid is Worst Prank Ever, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 1, 2017,
5:02 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/04/01/editorial-priva
tized-medicaid-worst-prank-ever/99733270/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
4. Editorial: Governor, Lawmakers Responsible for Florida’s Health Care Mess, TAMPA
BAY TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 5:25 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-gov
ernor-lawmakers-responsible-for-floridas-health-care-mess/2246508 (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
5. Debra Pressey, ‘The State Really Bungled This,’ THE NEWS-GAZETTE (Mar. 10, 2015,
7:00 AM), http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2015-03-10/state-really-bungled.html (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017).
6. During the summer of 2017, the future of the size, scope, and viability of Medicaid
nationwide was unclear. See Haeyoun Park & Wilson Andrews, The C.B.O. Did the Math. These
Are the Key Takeaways from the Senate Health Care Bill., N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/26/us/cbo-score-of-senate-health-care-bill.html
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (noting that by 2026, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that
fifteen million fewer people would be enrolled in Medicaid under the proposed Senate plan). This
uncertainty was largely due to the proposed cuts of nearly $800 billion to the program brought
about by the Better Care Reconciliation Act, which was being debated in the United States Senate.
Amy Goldstein & Kelsey Snell, Senate GOP Health-Care Bill Appears in Deeper Trouble
Following New CBO Report, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na
tional/health-science/imminent-cbo-report-could-prove-pivotal-for-senate-republicans-health-care
-bill/2017/06/26/cb8d61e2-59f7-11e7-a9f6-7c3296387341_story.html?utm_term=.aae8c1c6e259
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“[C]uts to the public insurance program for the poor still would
account for by far the largest share of the reduction in federal spending under the Senate bill—$772
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legal and policy-based solutions to address its most salient challenges. Tension
points—surrounding access, cost, and the ever-challenging environment of the
bidding and procurement process—currently threaten its widespread success
throughout the country.
This article summarizes and explores the current characteristics that define
Medicaid managed care, specifically its growing popularity, its regulatory
framework, and important details to consider when constructing states’ bidding
processes. It also seeks to present a number of illustrative narratives from the
states that have experimented with Medicaid managed care: the good, the bad,
and the ugly. Specifically, the stories of three states that have endured widelycovered litigation will be explored in an effort to paint the current landscape of
Medicaid’s move toward privatization, while also seeking to give state officials
who are considering an expansion or evolution of their Medicaid programs a
roadmap of both what to emulate and what to avoid.
This article proceeds in five parts. In Section II, the basics of Medicaid
managed care—from its history, to its current enrollment and costs, to its current
regulatory environment—will be summarized. In Section III, the ever-important
topic of the state bidding process will be explored, focusing extensively on the
most important considerations a state must address when building a fair and
efficient application process. In Section IV, states’ recent developments with
Medicaid managed care—particularly those that have either moved away from
or are substantially changing their managed care programs—will be reviewed.
In Section V, the sagas of three states’ bidding and selection processes—West
Virginia, Iowa, and Missouri—will be presented in an effort to distill important
lessons for states considering building fair and stable procurement processes.
Lastly, in Section VI, the challenges of cost and access, two constant concerns
within health law and policy literature, will be summarized as they relate to
Medicaid managed care.
II. MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: THE BASICS
Over the last twenty-five years, managed care has come to Medicaid. 7 Its
expansion is no doubt owed to the promise of predictability and cost control of

billion over the coming decade.”). The uncertainty of Medicaid’s future was also due to the $834
billion in cuts applied by the American Health Care Act, which was passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in May of 2017. Danielle Kurtzleben, GOP Health Plan Would Leave 23 Million
More Uninsured, Budget Office Says, NPR (May 24, 2017, 4:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/05
/24/529902300/cbo-republicans-ahca-would-leave-23-million-more-uninsured (last visited Sept.
1l, 2017) (“By far the biggest savings would come from Medicaid, which serves low-income
Americans. That program would face $834 billion in cuts.”).
7. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICAID
AND CHIP xvii (2016), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/June-2016-Reportto-Congress-on-Medicaid-and-CHIP.pdf (“States use many techniques to control spending,
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capitation 8 that it provides to states’ Medicaid programs. 9 Its adoption has been
steady and has continued into the era of recent reform. Even in the midst of
uncertainty for the nation’s largest public insurance program, 10 states continue
to explore, evolve, and expand privatization into Medicaid. This has constituted
an unmistakable policy shift, one that increased rapidly through the 1990s and
into the 2000s.
In an effort to better understand the impact of this dramatic policy shift, the
following subjects are explored: (1) the total enrollment of Medicaid managed
care, (2) the cost of Medicaid managed care, (3) the types of managed care plans
that have proliferated, and (4) the recent changes that seek to standardize and
clarify managed care regulations.
A.

Enrollment Numbers

For the expansive program of Medicaid, 11 states have increasingly turned to
private actors—particularly Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs)—to
administer their Medicaid programs to beneficiaries. As of spring 2017, thirtyeight states and the District of Columbia were working with MCOs to administer
including selective use of eligibility pathways, widespread use of managed care, imposition of tight
limits over provider payment, and strict management of coverage and utilization.”).
8. In Medicaid managed care, capitation stands for the monthly premium that is paid “for
each enrolled beneficiary.” Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Marketplaces, and Premium Assistance:
What Is at Stake in Arkansas? The Perils and Pitfalls of Medicaid Expansion Through Marketplace
Premium Assistance, 102 KY. L.J. 471, 473, 483 (2013–14). These are a “fixed amount for a defined
bundle of services, with some practitioner risk factors for costs in excess of the capitation amount.”
Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite,
13 NEV. L.J. 822, 861 (2013); see also Susan Fendell, The Unintended Results of Payment Reform
and Electronic Medical Records, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 173, 177–78 (2014).
9. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 7, at 32 (“States
contract with private health plans on a fixed (capitated) payment basis to provide Medicaid benefits
to defined groups of enrollees. This approach can moderate cost growth through two mechanisms.
First, federal rules allow managed care plans to use certain tools to limit the growth of per-person
spending, including selective provider contracting, the use of drug formularies, and the option to
offer alternative services in lieu of covered Medicaid services if the alternative services are more
cost-effective. Second, by transferring insurance risk to private plans, states can gain greater
predictability in their costs, limiting the state’s own risk to costs associated with increases in
enrollment (within the limits of the actuarial soundness rules). In these ways, state Medicaid
programs can not only achieve greater cost predictability, but can also require and enforce full
adherence to standards for access and improvements in the quality of care, goals that are difficult
to achieve under fee for service.”)
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. As of January 1, 2017, Medicaid paid for approximately half of all births, sixty-four
percent of all nursing home residents, and thirty-nine percent of all children. Margot Sanger-Katz,
G.O.P. Health Plan Is Really a Rollback of Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/06/21/upshot/gop-health-plan-is-really-a-rollback-of-medicaid.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2017) (“Medicaid is the country’s largest government health care program, covering more
Americans than its better-known sibling, Medicare.”).
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Medicaid to their beneficiaries. 12 By the end of 2014, 265 MCOs provided
comprehensive services to these thirty-nine Medicaid programs. 13 Nationwide,
more than ninety percent of Medicaid beneficiaries lived in these states. 14 By
the end of 2016, the overall number of managed care enrollees seemed poised to
grow. 15
Medicaid managed care growth has been rapid but constant. Only 750,000
Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in a managed care plan just thirty-four
years ago, which accounted for about three percent of all Medicaid
beneficiaries. 16 By 1994, nearly eight million beneficiaries had been enrolled in
managed care, which constituted twenty-three percent of all Medicaid
beneficiaries. 17 Startlingly, just six years later, in 2000, more than fifty percent
of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in a managed care plan. 18 And by 2008,
that percentage exceeded seventy percent, before rising to seventy-five percent
in 2012. 19
Although the numbers are not exact, 20 based on most recent data in July
2014, of the roughly seventy-two million Medicaid beneficiaries (including

12. Total Medicaid MCO Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/total-medicaid-mco-enrollment/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:
%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) (listing Medicaid
MCO enrollment by state, and noting that Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington are states with more than one million Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicaid
MCO).
13. JULIA PARADISE, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FINDINGS ON MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MEDICAID MANAGED CARE MARKET TRACKER 1 (2014),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/key-findings-on-medicaid-managed-care-highlights-from-the-medi
caid-managed-care-market-tracker-report.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Mike Cason, Alabama Medicaid Change to Managed Care Postponed till
October, AL.COM (Nov. 25, 2016, 5:05 PM), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016
/11/alabma_medicaid_change_to_mana.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) (noting that “Alabama
since 2013 has been working on a plan to shift some of the state’s 1 million Medicaid patients to
managed care” but also noting a delay due to the “uncertainty about funding and what changes the
Trump administration” may be bringing to Medicaid).
16. Medicaid and Managed Care—Policy Brief (June 1995), KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-and-managed-care-policy-brief/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2017).
17. Id.
18. Medicaid Managed Care: Trends and Snapshots 2000-2013, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. 5 fig.1, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/bytopics/data-and-systems/medicaid-managed-care/downloads/2013-medicaid-managed-care-trends
-and-snapshots-2000-2013.pdf.
19. Id.
20. See Caroline F. Pearson, Avalere Analysis: Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Set to
Grow by 13.5 Million, AVALERE HEALTH (Oct. 23, 2014), http://avalere.com/expertise/managedcare/insights/avalere-analysis-medicaid-managed-care-enrollment-set-to-grow-by-13.5-milli (last
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dually-eligible beneficiaries), 21 about fifty-five million, or about seventy-seven
percent, were enrolled in some kind of Medicaid managed care plan. 22 Of those
fifty-five million enrolled in a Medicaid managed care plan in 2014, about fortythree million, or about seventy-nine percent, were enrolled in a comprehensive
managed care plan. 23 This accounted for about sixty percent of all Medicaid
beneficiaries nationwide. 24 Nonetheless, it is not clear whether or not these mid2014 numbers incorporate the full impact of the Medicaid expansion under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which bolstered enrollment
in managed care plans upon its enactment.
B.

Types of Plans

Generally, there are three types of Medicaid managed care plans: (1) primary
care case management plans (PCCMs), (2) prepaid health plans (PHPs), and (3)
fully capitated, comprehensive full-risk plans. 25 PCCMs are plans that employ a

visited Sept. 11, 2017) (noting a fairly smaller nationwide managed care enrollment at sixty-seven
percent in 2013); see also Virgil Dickson & Bob Herman, 85% Medical-Loss Ratio in Final
Managed Medicaid Rule, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20160425/NEWS/160429951 (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (noting the enrollment of lowincome people on Medicaid in 2015 amounted to forty-six million).
21. The moniker of “dual eligible” beneficiaries refers to individuals who are eligible for both
Medicare and Medicaid. Eliminating the “dual eligible” from the enrollment count provides a
Medicaid (and CHIP) enrollment in July 2014 of 67.2 million Americans. See Total Monthly
Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-in
dicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment/?activeTab=graph&currentTimeframe=1&
startTimeframe=40&selectedDistributions=total-monthly-medicaidchip-enrollment&sortModel=
%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Aug. 26, 2017)
(“This number includes only those individuals who are eligible for comprehensive benefits (e.g.,
emergency Medicaid, family planning-only coverage and limited benefit dual eligible individuals
are excluded).”).
22. Total Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/state-indicator/total-medicaid-mc-enrollment/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B
%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Sept. 11, 2017)
(finding that California had the most individual beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicaid managed care
plan, with nearly eight million beneficiary enrollees); Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment and
Program Characteristics, 2014, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 17–18 (Spring 2016),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/data-and-systems/medi
caid-managed-care/downloads/2014-medicaid-managed-care-enrollment-report.pdf.
23. Medicaid Enrollment in Comprehensive Risk-Based Managed Care, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-enrollment-in-comprehensive-risk
-based-managed-care/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Sept. 11, 2017); Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment
and Program Characteristics, 2014, supra note 22, at 8 (noting that beneficiaries enrolled in
comprehensive MCOs jumped from thirty-five million in 2013 to over forty-three million in 2014).
24. Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment and Program Characteristics, 2014, supra note 22,
at 23 tbl. 4.
25. Medicaid and Managed Care—Policy Brief (June 1995), supra note 16.
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primary care provider to act as a “gatekeeper” who is paid “a per-patient monthly
case management fee to compensate for the provider’s expanded administrative
responsibilities” even though the provider “do[es] not assume financial risk for
the provision of these services.” 26 PHPs are prepaid plans that provide a
particular type of service; they are paid a “fixed monthly capitation payment[]
for each eligible enrollee.” 27 Finally, a risk-based comprehensive plan is
administered by a private company that “assumes the financial risk of providing
all of the medically necessary services under the contract.” 28
Comprehensive managed care plans are defined as plans that “provide[]
comprehensive benefits,” including “acute, primary care, specialty, and any
other,” with some comprehensive plans providing long-term care and behavioral
health coverage. 29 Of those beneficiaries not enrolled in comprehensive
managed care plans in 2014, millions were enrolled in “limited benefit managed
care programs” and PHPs, including more than 12.1 million who had behavioral
health organization coverage (which included prepaid inpatient and ambulatory
services), about 5.5 million who had dental coverage, and more than 7.2 million
who were enrolled in a PCCM plan. 30
State enrollment in different plans varies across the country. Some states,
like Alabama, only enroll beneficiaries in a PCCM. 31 Others, like Hawaii, enroll
the vast majority of their total Medicaid beneficiaries in a comprehensive
managed care plan. 32 Still others, like Louisiana and Massachusetts, enroll their
Medicaid beneficiaries in a mix of comprehensive plans, PCCMs, and various
PHPs for behavioral health and dental services. 33
C. Costs
Mirroring the reality of health care pricing and financing, Medicaid
managed care expenditures are growing. According to a report by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), payments and premiums under
26. Id. In these programs, services are still paid on a fee-for-service reimbursement scheme.
See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE
EVOLUTION OF MANAGED CARE IN MEDICAID 64 (June 2011), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/01/MACPAC_June2011_web.pdf. States have also established “enhanced
PCCM[s],” where “states may provide incentive payments to promote quality, increased care
coordination, and management of complex chronic conditions.” Id. Indeed, states pay bonuses for
performance measures or withhold a portion of reimbursement based upon a failure to meet
benchmarks. See id. at 65.
27. Medicaid and Managed Care—Policy Brief (June 1995), supra note 16.
28. Id.
29. Medicaid Enrollment in Comprehensive Risk-Based Managed Care, supra note 23.
30. Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment and Program Characteristics, 2014, supra note 22,
at 19–20 tbl. 2.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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managed care programs are projected to grow at an average of eleven percent
between 2014 and 2023, which is much faster than long-term care fee-forservice and acute care fee-for-service. 34 According to this projection,
expenditures for Medicaid managed care plans are likely to reach $400 billion
by 2023. 35
However, those estimates may be low. In 2016, Medicaid managed care
expenditures increased more than 13% from 2015. 36 Nonetheless, this growth
was much slower than the growth seen in 2014 and 2015, which saw year-overyear expenditure gains of 27.8% and 31.2%, perhaps “due to the deceleration of
states expanding Medicaid after two years of significant activity.” 37
In real dollars, Medicaid managed care expenditures reached $269 billion in
2016, up from $238 billion in 2015. 38 More noteworthy, however, was that
Medicaid managed care’s expenditures as a percentage of total Medicaid
expenditures reached 49.1% in 2016. 39 This was a major increase, up from
38.9% in 2014, 29.4% in 2012, and just 19.5% in 2007. 40 As of 2017, more than
fifty cents of every Medicaid dollar spent in the United States is a Medicaid
managed care expenditure, which is 2.5 times the percentage of Medicaid
expenditures spent on managed care just ten years before. 41
D. 2016 Regulatory Changes
In spring 2016, CMS published final rules that updated the regulation of
Medicaid managed care plans nationwide. 42 According to CMS, the final rule
“aligns key rules with those of other health insurance coverage programs,
modernizes how states purchase managed care for beneficiaries, and strengthens
the consumer experience and key consumer protections.” 43 Specifically, it links

34. Medicaid Managed Care: Trends and Snapshots 2000-2013, supra note 18, at 21.
35. Id. at 18 fig. 11.
36. HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., Medicaid Managed Care Spending in 2016, HEALTH MGMT.
ASSOCIATES: BLOG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.healthmanagement.com/blog/medicaid-managed
-care-spending-2016/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (noting that during the period between 2007 and 2016, Medicaid managed care grew
at about 18% per year, while Medicaid expenditures grew on average of 6.5% annually). The
expenditures per beneficiary vary substantially by plan type and service category. See id.
41. HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., supra note 36.
42. See Medicaid and CHIP Managed Care Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,498, 27,498 (May 6,
2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 433, 438, 440, 457, and 495); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., Medicaid and CHIP Managed Care Final Rule, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/managed-care/guidance/final-rule/index.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2017) (noting that the “final rule [was] the first major update to Medicaid and CHIP
managed care regulations in more than a decade”).
43. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 42.
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the regulation of Medicaid managed care to regulations that govern Medicare
Advantage plans and Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) that are sold on the ACA
individual exchange markets. 44
Substantively, the final CMS rule constitutes a grab bag of regulations
intended to bolster beneficiary protections and improve the functionality of the
marketplace. It imposes network adequacy requirements 45 (including continuity
of care requirements for transitions and for long-term support service adequacy
requirements), requires written quality strategies, encourages quality ratings,
and mandates improvement projects for Medicaid managed care plans. 46 It also
requires states to address problems of over- and under-utilization within their
managed care programs. 47
Additionally, the final rule: (1) requires internal and external review (in
addition to new notice requirements) for adverse coverage determinations; (2)
encourages states to force managed care plans to implement new value-based
payment models (as it has for Medicare in a mandated fashion); 48 (3) provides
beneficiaries with support, counseling, and enrollment protections; and (4)
inserts new program integrity requirements, including screening for certain
providers before admitting them to a network. 49
The new rule imposes specific actuarial value metrics on Medicaid managed
care plans. Specifically, it mandates a medical-loss ratio (MLR) requirement on
Medicaid managed plans, 50 mandating that they set an MLR of eighty-five

44. See Timothy Jost, Medicaid Managed Care Final Rule: Examining the Alignment with
Qualified Health Plan Requirements (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2016), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2016/04/29/medicaid-managed-care-final-rule-examining-the-alignment-withqualified-health-plan-requirements/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (comparing managed care plan
regulation and the rules that govern QHPs and noting, “[This] is the first major update of the
Medicaid managed care (MMC) rules since 2002 and comprehensively overhauls MMC
requirements and oversight”).
45. See Dickson & Herman, supra note 20 (“HHS’ Office of the Inspector General found a
clear need for better provider networks in Medicaid programs, saying in a harsh 2014 report that
states were not ensuring Medicaid patients had enough hospitals and doctors to care for them.”).
46. Julia Paradise & MaryBeth Musumeci, CMS’s Final Rule on Medicaid Managed Care: A
Summary of Major Provisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1, 3 (June 2016), http://files.kff.org/attach
ment/CMSs-Final-Rule-on-Medicaid-Managed-Care.
47. Id.
48. See Dickson & Herman, supra note 20 (“The federal government has made explicit goals
to move Medicare toward alternative payment models and away from fee-for-service medical
claims, and the final rule will incentivize states and health plans to do the same for Medicaid.”).
49. See Paradise & Musumeci, supra note 46, at 1.
50. This direct regulation of actuarial value matches the direct regulation of MLRs of
individual plans sold on the ACA exchanges. See Jost, supra note 44; Dickson & Herman, supra
note 20 (“[A]ll insurers must spend at least 85% of their Medicaid revenue on medical care and
other activities that improve quality. The remaining 15% can be spent on employee salaries,
marketing, profits and other administrative tasks.”).
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percent for rate periods starting on July 1, 2017. 51 The regulation provides that
plans failing to meet the eighty-five percent MLR threshold could be subject to
penalties and likely “will have their state rates lowered in the future.” 52
Nonetheless, studies have found that about seventy-five percent of managed care
plans in 2015 had an MLR at or above eighty-five percent. 53
Finally, in a part of the rule that was finalized at the beginning of 2017, CMS
sought to redirect payments for Medicaid managed care plans that reportedly
total $3.3 billion annually. 54 These payments, “paid to Medicaid managed care
plans on top of the base capitation rate,” require the plans to “pass these
payments to contracted providers that treat a disproportionate share of Medicaid
or uninsured patients.” 55 In the rule that was finalized in January 2017, “CMS
told states to stop making such payments” but gave them a handful of years to
do so. 56 Further, the rule changes the payments to link them to the quality of care
provided instead of a straight pass through as it existed, 57 which was reportedly
“not actuarially sound.” 58 This has impacted states’ plans to privatize their
Medicaid programs, as these payments can make up a large percentage of
payments for providers who see patients enrolled in a Medicaid managed care
plan. 59 The American Hospital Association was “disappointed” in the rule. 60
III. THE BIDDING PROCESS: TRENDS AND DETAILS
Much of the press related to Medicaid managed care has been generated by
its bidding process—the process by which states award contracts to private
carriers to administer their Medicaid programs. 61 The process has been subject
to political allegations of favoritism, which resulted in a number of lawsuits,

51. Jost, supra note 44.
52. Dickson & Herman, supra note 20.
53. Jill Brostowitz et al., Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) in the “Mega Reg,” MILLIMAN 7 (June
24, 2016), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2016/mlr-mega-reg-webinar-mate
rials.pdf.
54. Virgil Dickson, Final Pass-Through Pay Rule Would Cost Hospitals More Than $3 Billion
a Year, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170117
/NEWS/170119909 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. ADVISORY BD., CMS Finalizes Rule to Block New ‘Pass-Through’ Payments for Medicaid
Providers, DAILY BRIEFING (Jan. 19, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/
2017/01/19/cms-medicaid-pass-through (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
58. See Dickson, supra note 54.
59. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.
60. Morgan Haefner, CMS Finalizes Rule on Medicaid Managed Care Pass-Through
Payments: 5 Things to Know, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.beckershospital
review.com/payer-issues/cms-finalizes-rule-on-medicaid-managed-care-pass-through-payments5-things-to-know.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
61. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 60.
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often between competing bidders. A summary of the typical bidding process—
and a quick summary of some of its trends—follows below.
Within Medicaid managed care, states have latitude in determining the type
of rate-setting and bidding processes they establish. In setting the rates for its
Medicaid managed care contract, a state can elect to establish its own capitation
rate (often referred to as fixed offer or “administered pricing” plans), can
establish a range of acceptable rates and allow plans to bid on specific rates
(often relying on a request for proposals (RFP)), or can elect to construct a
hybrid method of the established rate process and the competitive bid process
by establishing a fixed range of rates. 62 The state’s proposed rates must be
“actuarially sound.” 63 Further, with exceptions, states that mandate that
Medicaid beneficiaries must enroll in a managed care plan “must give those
beneficiaries a choice of at least two [plans]” from which to choose. 64 Rural
residents are exempt from the choice requirements. 65 States must explore
different factors in setting the rates, determining the risk adjustment and risk
sharing arrangements, and designing other plan guidelines and limitations.
A.

Determining the Rate

States examine a number of factors in setting capitation rates using “data
and adjustment factors to predict enrollees’ use of health care services and the
expected cost of these services.” 66 In determining these rates, states consider
baseline data, 67 trends (in an effort to “establish an expected per member per

62. Id. at 59–60. Under the established rate, “[t]he managed care plan may accept or reject the
offered capitation rate—or, in some cases, may have an opportunity to negotiate the rate.” Robert
Damler et al., Fixed Offer or Competitive Bid? Choosing the Right Medicaid Managed Care
Contracting Methodology for Your State’s Needs, MILLIMAN 1 (Mar. 2015), http://www.milliman.
com/uploadedFiles/insight/2015/fixed-offer-competitive-bid.pdf. Under the competitive bid
process, the range will be established and may be shared, after which the “managed care plans will
then provide a bid rate,” which “will ultimately need to fall within the state’s actuary’s certified
rate range.” Id.
63. Damler et al., supra note 62, at 3. Further, “[t]he capitation rates that are paid to a managed
care health plan must fall within the capitation rate range certified by the state’s actuary.” Id.
64. 42 C.F.R. § 438.52(a) (2016).
65. Id. § 438.52(b).
66. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 60.
67. Id. (“Depending on the type of contracting method that a state chooses, states or plans
typically set rates based on either FFS or managed care services and utilization data . . . if available,
or both.”).
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month amount”), 68 the fiscal health of the state, 69 carve outs, 70 additional
payments (these include so-called “kick payments” that may be used for
maternity services or transplant coverage, for example), 71 and other incentives
that may be built into the contract. 72
B.

Risk Adjustment and Risk Sharing

Importantly, insurance plans must appropriately assume risk so that they can
make a profit from Medicaid managed care contracts with states, 73 but states
must also seek to “prevent MCOs from ‘cream-skimming’ by finding ways to
disproportionately attract healthy enrollees.” 74 According to the Medicaid and
CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), in the past, “states have
adjusted plan payment rates for demographic factors” like “paying higher rates
for older enrollees.” 75 Recently, states are setting rates based on the health status
of beneficiaries. 76 They may also charge different rates for different home zip
codes “based on regional variation in costs.” 77
Risk adjustment is vital, as it can “affect plans’ willingness to participate in
Medicaid managed care, particularly for more complex populations . . . or those
with disabilities” in the first place. 78 It is also an important tool states can use to
try to prevent insurance companies from engaging in “adverse selection” or
“cherry picking” so as to enroll healthier individuals. 79 Risk adjustment

68. Id. at 61. Also, according to MACPAC, “states also adjust rates to account for efficiency
factors,” including “reductions in emergency department (ED) services, unnecessary inpatient
admissions, or the use of brand name drugs when a generic substitute is available.” Id.
69. Id. (“[S]tates may set managed care rates assuming reductions in profit margins, marketing
costs, and other factors.”). See also, e.g., infra Section III.B.
70. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 61. These include
any services that are excluded, like “behavioral health, transportation, [or] oral health,” Id.
Importantly, “Medicaid managed care enrollees may still be able to access these services through
FFS Medicaid or through a limited-benefit plan that is contracted to provide these services.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. These often include bonuses (“3 percent of per member per month” plans, for instance)
for stellar performance. Id.
73. See id. at 62 (“Risk adjustment helps assure that health plans receive payment sufficient
to cover the costs of delivering and arranging care efficiently without compromising quality and
access.”).
74. Robert Book, Benefits and Challenges of Medicaid Managed Care, FORBES (Oct. 18,
2012, 10:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/10/18/benefits-and-challenges-of-medi
caid-managed-care/#692b3306720f (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
75. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 62.
76. Id.
77. Book, supra note 74.
78. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 62.
79. Id.
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techniques include assessing demographics, health status, and pharmacy
histories. 80
Finally, to alleviate some of the risk taken on by insurance carriers, 81 states
can build in processes that help protect the insurance company from major losses
in the insurance marketplace, “includ[ing] risk corridors, [or] stop-loss or
reinsurance provisions.” 82
A risk corridor helps to stabilize the risk that is taken by the MCO. For
instance, in a risk corridor:
In the event that actual utilization exceeds the expected level by more than a
specified percentage, the MCO would receive additional payments to make up
for part or all of the difference. Conversely, if actual utilization is below the
expected level by more than a specified percentage, the MCO would have to
provide a partial refund to the Medicaid program. 83

Stop-loss or reinsurance programs are similar: They are insurance plans that
shelter organizations “against those ultra-expensive ‘shock’ claims that can
wreak years’ worth of financial havoc with just a few days of hospital
charges.” 84 Stop-loss provisions often set a particular threshold of charges,
beyond which “states will assume some or all of the enrollee’s cost of care.” 85
Indeed, when thresholds are set that protect insurance companies, states may
lower the capitation rates for the managed care plan. 86
Alleviating risk often also includes giving insurance companies notice of the
makeup of the insurance risk pool. In an effort to limit costs, the managed care
company would want to ensure that its Medicaid pool is relatively healthy. 87 To

80. Id.
81. See Book, supra note 74. (“Setting specific per-patient monthly rates transfers the risk of
statistical variation in health care needs from the state and the federal governments to the MCOs,”
and “this is a benefit for the governments,” but “a downside for the MCOs.”).
82. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 62.
83. Book, supra note 74.
84. Peter Wehrwein, Reinsurance and Stop-Loss Coverage: Are You on a Firm Footing?,
MANAGED CARE (Feb. 1998), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1998/2/reinsuranceand-stop-loss-coverage-are-you-firm-footing (last visited Sept. 12, 2017); see also, e.g., Stop Loss
Program, N.Y. STATE DEP’T. OF HEALTH, (Oct. 2016), https://www.health.ny.gov/facilities/hospi
tal/reimbursement/stoploss/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Stop Loss is a type of reinsurance, or
risk protection, offered by NYS to Medicaid managed care plans, which is intended to limit the
plan’s liability for individual enrollees.”).
85. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 63.
86. Id.
87. See Medicaid Best Buys: Critical Strategies to Focus on High-Need, High-Cost
Beneficiaries, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC. (Apr. 2010), https://www.chcs.org/me
dia/Medicaid_Best_Buys_2010.pdf (“[T]he majority of those currently [in 2010] enrolled in
managed care are relatively healthy.”).
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accomplish this, these plans may seek to exclude higher-cost beneficiaries, who
then are covered by the state, often in a fee-for-service program. 88
This category of beneficiaries, referred to as “Beneficiaries with Complex
Care Needs and High Costs,” includes “super-utilizers.” 89 Super-utilizers are
“an extremely heterogeneous group with varying medical, behavioral, and
psycho-social needs.” 90 Interestingly, like in private insurance, the most
expensive one percent of Medicaid beneficiaries make up one-fourth of overall
Medicaid expenditures, and the top five percent account for fifty-four percent of
all Medicaid expenditures. 91 Nonetheless, “states increasingly are looking to
expand their Medicaid managed care programs to cover more . . . high-cost
populations and services,” largely due to the budget predictability of managed
care. 92 In transitioning high-cost beneficiaries to managed care, critics have
concerns over health care access and quality for these populations. 93
C. Other Characteristics
Finally, other considerations that must be undertaken by the state involve
details surrounding the bidding and contract award process. Indeed, as has been
mentioned, “Protests of contract awards are a fact of life in public procurement,
making protest mitigation strategies a necessity—especially in critical and highcost areas such as Medicaid managed care.” 94 To simplify the contractual
options, the state “can limit the number of slots available for winning bids.” 95
Finally, the state needs to prioritize values other than just cost savings, such as
88. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 26, at 4; see also CTR.
HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC., supra note 87, at 2 (“[T]he bulk of beneficiaries with the
most challenging health care needs are in the fragmented and uncoordinated fee-for-service
delivery system.”).
89. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Improving Care for Medicaid Beneficiaries
with Complex Care Needs and High Costs, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/state-re
source-center/innovation-accelerator-program/beneficiaries-with-complex-needs/beneficiarieswith-complex-needs.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Michael Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care: Costs, Access, and Quality of Care, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/
2012/rwjf401106.
93. Id. at 2.
94. See Damler et al., supra note 62, at 2. Damler et al. notes that both the competitive bidding
and state-set capitation rate bidding bring challenges of their own:
Competitive bidding adds complexity to the procurement process, thus creating more
avenues for protest. On the other hand, state-set capitation rates eliminate the quantitative
cost element of scoring and thus increase the likelihood of attempts by protesting parties to
question the details underlying the subjective evaluation process. States should clearly
understand what benefits they hope to achieve with the selection of either state set capitation
rates or competitive bidding. Id.
95. Id.

FOR

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

122

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:107

seamlessness, quality, and access for the beneficiaries on a Medicaid managed
care plan. 96
IV. RECENT NOTEWORTHY DEVELOPMENTS
Even though most states have moved toward expanding managed care
offerings within their Medicaid programs and a number have trumpeted their
savings, 97 at least two states, Connecticut and Oklahoma, have recently moved
away from managed care. 98 A third state, Illinois, is revamping its managed care
offerings in the state, which may ultimately lead to an expanding enrollment. 99
Quick summaries of these three states’ forays into—and away from—managed
care are explored immediately below.
A.

Moving Away: Connecticut

In one of the more widely publicized moves of the last decade, Connecticut
largely abandoned its Medicaid managed care effort in late 2011 100 after being
called a “cautionary tale” of inadequate networks and chaotic enrollment. 101
Claiming that the state had “diminishing confidence in the value of what [MCOs
96. See ANTHEM PUB. POLICY INST., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR MEMBERS WITH
MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS AND/OR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS: INTEGRATING BENEFITS
AND CARE 2 (Dec. 2016), https://www.antheminc.com/cs/groups/wellpoint/documents/wlp_assets/
d19n/mjg2/~edisp/pw_g286050.pdf (an insurance carrier within Medicaid managed care programs
noting the importance of “integrated, person-centered care” focused on “access, quality of care,
health out-comes, and spending,” as well as “seamless care”).
97. See, e.g., Schorsch, supra note 1 (“In Arizona, Medicaid officials estimate they saved
nearly $29.5 billion over the last five years by outsourcing the bulk of their enrollees’ health care
to private insurers. Ohio did the same thing, and the results are promising. From 2009 to 2013, it
slowed the growth of costs in its $25 billion Medicaid program from 9 percent to 3 percent. Annual
spending has remained relatively flat ever since.”).
98. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, Connecticut Drops Insurers from Medicaid, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://khn.org/news/connecticut-drops-insurers-from-medicaid/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Connecticut’s decision stands out at a time when a growing number of
states are requiring more people in Medicaid to join managed care plans—Florida, Texas, and
California are among nearly two dozen states planning expansions in 2012.”).
99. See infra Section III.C. Governor Rauner seeks to shrink the number of managed care
plans in the state, but expand the enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care, especially
south of Chicago. Schorsch, supra note 1.
100. Galewitz, supra note 98 (“In the past decade, most states have turned Medicaid over to
private [insurance] plans with the hopes they could control costs and improve care. Nearly half of
the 60 million people in the government program for the poor are now in managed care plans run
by insurance giants such as UnitedHealthcare and Aetna. But Connecticut, the ‘insurance capital
of the world,’ is bucking the trend.”).
101. A Cautionary Tale from CT on Medicaid Managed Care Plans, HEALTH CARE FOR ALL
(May 13, 2008) (citing Jane Zhang, HMO Pullouts Upend Connecticut Medicaid, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2008, at A4), http://www.hcfama.org/blog/cautionary-tale-ct-medicaid-managed-careplans (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“[T]he small number of managed care plans in the Connecticut
Medicaid program are heading for the door or have already left.”).
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were] providing,” Connecticut moved its Medicaid population of nearly a halfmillion beneficiaries back under state control. 102
The state moved back to a fee-for-service reimbursement scheme, so-called
“managed fee-for-service,” 103 and in early 2016, reportedly saved money
(particularly on administrative costs) and improved care after making the
move. 104 Per-person Medicaid costs in Connecticut have dropped in recent
years—reportedly decreasing nearly six percent year over year in 2016 105—and
at least part of the cost savings could be due to Connecticut’s decision to move
away from managed care. 106 As other states’ Medicaid privatization efforts have
been criticized, the story of Connecticut has been used to galvanize support
toward a traditional publicly-funded and administered state Medicaid
program. 107

102. Galewitz, supra note 98.
103. Melinda Beck, Connecticut Moves Away from Private Insurers to Administer Medicaid
Program, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2016, 6:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/connecticut-moves
-away-from-private-insurers-to-administer-medicaid-program-1458325696 (last visited Sept. 12,
2017).
104. Id. (“At a time when most states are paying private insurers to provide health care for their
Medicaid recipients, Connecticut says it has saved money and improved care by going the opposite
way.”); Katherine Moody, Connecticut Touts Success of Its ‘Managed Fee-for-Service’ Medicaid
Model, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Mar. 21, 2016, 10:52 AM), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/
connecticut-touts-success-its-managed-fee-for-service-medicaid-model (last visited Sept. 12,
2017) (“This, state officials tell the WSJ, has cut administrative costs to 5 percent of total costs,
compared with 12 percent on average at Medicaid managed-care plans.”).
105. Arielle Levin Becker, Medicaid Costs in Connecticut Have a Silver Lining, HARTFORD
COURANT (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:51 AM), http://www.courant.com/health/hc-ctm-medicaid-spendingdown-20160119-story.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). State officials also noted that other
changes and healthier beneficiaries may have contributed to the decline. See id.; Beck, supra note
103 (“Average cost per patient, per month, is down from $718 in mid-2012 [when Connecticut
made the switch] to $670 [in 2015], according to state data. The number of doctors willing to treat
Medicaid patients is up 7% and as a result fewer patients are using emergency rooms for routine
care.”).
106. See Becker, supra note 105 (noting that now one company administers the Medicaid
program and the state is “responsible for claims costs”).
107. See, e.g., Editorial: Connecticut Abandoned Privatized Medicaid, DES MOINES REG.
(Mar. 22, 2016, 9:23 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/03/22/
editorial-connecticut-abandoned-privatized-medicaid/82081130/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017)
(detailing Connecticut’s move and noting: “The irony of all this should not be lost on a single
Iowan. While [Governor] Branstad has dragged the people of this state into privatization,
Connecticut is finding savings and success pursing [sic] the model of state-managed Medicaid our
state is now abandoning. That’s the model in which public dollars compensate doctors, not
stockholders. The questions before us now: How much damage will be done to Iowa before state
officials have the epiphany that Connecticut had about privatization? How much damage will be
done before Iowans vote for changes in leadership?”).
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Moving Away (and Then Back?): Oklahoma

In 2004, Oklahoma became the first state to move away from Medicaid
managed care following rapid rate increases and a conclusion that the state could
administer Medicaid coverage at a fraction of the cost of its private SoonerCare
Plus program. 108 The program “struggled from the start” due to “the weakness
of Oklahoma’s HMO market,” and following rate increases that approached
twenty percent, the Oklahoma Health Care Authority ended the program on
January 1, 2004. 109
Nonetheless, in 2015, the Oklahoma legislature passed House Bill 1566,
“which require[d] the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) to solicit
requests for proposals for care coordination models for Oklahomans on
Medicaid who [were] aged, blind, or [had] a disability.” 110 This proposal would
cover a population that made up only about fifteen percent of Oklahoma’s
Medicaid beneficiaries but that constituted more than forty-six percent of
Oklahoma’s annual Medicaid expenditures. 111
The managed care RFP was released by the state on November 30, 2016,
seeking “care coordination models” for aged, blind, and disabled (ABD)
beneficiaries. 112 The new program, SoonerHealth+, sought to establish a
capitated payment for health services for the ABD population on a “per member
per month” basis. 113 The request sought between two to four contracts in two
different regions of the state (East and West) and intended to award the contracts
by the summer of 2017 for the plans to commence administering care on April
1, 2018. 114
However, by spring of 2017, with Oklahoma moving forward with the new
program, concerns arose over funding, particularly over the new federal
supplemental payment rules involving pass-through payments. 115 Due to
108. See David Blatt, Lessons Unlearned?, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 20, 2013), http://okpoli
cy.org/lessons-unlearned/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
109. Id.
110. Carly Putnam, Back on the Road to Medicaid Managed Care, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 7,
2015), http://okpolicy.org/back-on-the-road-to-medicaid-managed-care/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2017).
111. Id. (“Legislators who supported HB 1566 believe that there are potential cost savings to
be found by instituting a managed care system.”).
112. SoonerHealth+ Managed Care RFP Released, OKLA. HOSP. ASS’N. (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.okoha.com/OHA/Hotline/2016/Dec._16/SoonerHealth+%20managed%20care%20RF
P%20released.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Other SoonerCare members [the non-ABD
population] will remain in the fee-for-service Medicaid program.”).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Dale Denwalt, Experts Worry About Future of Oklahoma Medicaid Funding, THE
OKLAHOMAN (Apr. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5544753 (noting challenges
facing the transition to privatization) (last visited Sept. 12, 2017); see also supra notes 54–60 and
accompanying text.
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concerns over limitations on pass-through payments from the federal level and
fresh concerns over state funding (including as much as $100 million in state
startup funds for the privatization effort), the Oklahoma Health Care Authority
terminated the bidding process after being asked by Governor Mary Fallin to
delay its implementation for one year. 116 A number of Oklahoma’s health care
providers and hospitals were pleased by the cancellation. 117
C. A Current “Reboot” in Illinois
Illinois is in the midst of a so-called “reboot,” where newly-elected
Governor Bruce Rauner is seeking to “limit the number of insurers that contract
with the state, expand managed care statewide to fill gaps in care and focus on
mental health and addiction.” 118 With uncertainty swirling around Medicaid
policy, this could be a risky proposition and has been criticized, 119 particularly
given Illinois’ recent budgetary crisis and the fact that the state added more than
600,000 people to its Medicaid enrollment following the Medicaid expansion
under the ACA. 120 More than three million citizens are Medicaid beneficiaries
in Illinois. 121
Down from about thirty insurers, 122 Illinois now relies on twelve insurers to
administer Medicaid services to about two-thirds of its overall Medicaid
116. Dale Denwalt, Asked to Delay Privatization, Oklahoma’s Medicaid Agency Opts to
Cancel, THE OKLAHOMAN (June 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5553169 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2017).
117. See id. (“Some people in the health care industry are relieved that privatization of an
Oklahoma Medicaid program has ground to a halt for lack of funds.”); Nursing Home Advocates
Praise Decision to Delay Managed Care Implementation, EDMOND SUN (June 23, 2017),
http://www.edmondsun.com/news/nursing-home-advocates-praise-decision-to-delay-managedcare-implementation/article_116120a8-5860-11e7-8ad1-330281387ff7.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2017) (“A diverse coalition of health care providers, including nursing homes, hospitals, mental
health professionals, and both the Oklahoma State University and University of Oklahoma medical
centers had expressed concerns about the plan. . . . The Oklahoma Association of Health Care
Providers (OAHCP), which represents the state’s nursing homes, praised the decision.”).
118. Schorsch, supra note 1.
119. See Lisa Schencker, 4 Insurers Out of Running for Rauner’s Medicaid Overhaul, CHI.
TRIB. (May 16, 2017, 4:53 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-medicaid-managedcare-bids-0516-biz-2-20170515-story.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (quoting the state
comptroller’s criticism in which she questions the “monumental change” during “unprecedented
upheaval,” at a time when there is no working budget for the state).
120. Kenneth S. Polonsky, Commentary: ACA Repeal Means Serious Risk for Illinois, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ctobamacare-repeal-effects-medicaid-illinois-perspec-0217-md-20170216-story.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2017) (“The decisions that will be made in Washington in the coming weeks will have a
major impact on access to health care for many years to come. Illinois faces particular challenges.”).
121. Id.
122. Kristen Schorsch, Rauner Scraps Medicaid Managed Care, Outlines New Plan, CRAIN’S
CHI. BUS. (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170227/NEWS03/1702298
96/rauner-scraps-illinois-medicaid-managed-care-program (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
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population (about two million people) through its managed care program. 123 As
of 2017, Governor Rauner wants to decrease that number to “between four and
seven” 124 and wants to expand the number of beneficiaries on managed care to
eighty percent. 125 Changes are underway, as the state has reportedly “confirmed
it will competitively bid managed care contracts” starting in 2018; Illinois is
studying other states’ plans. 126
In spring 2017, Governor Rauner’s plans resulted in a “major shake-up of
the program, with several insurers . . . out of the running” to administer the
Medicaid program. 127 Specifically, four of the twelve insurers that operated
within the managed care program—insurers that administered Medicaid
managed care services for more than 200,000 of the state’s Medicaid
beneficiaries—did not submit a competitive bid in response to an RFP from the
state. 128 By August, Governor Rauner’s administration had selected the six
companies that would administer Illinois’ new managed care program, and in
October, Rauner vetoed a bill that would have required future awarding of
managed care contracts to be subject to a stricter state bid procurement
process. 129
V. CONTROVERSY AND LITIGATION
Perhaps Medicaid managed care’s biggest media spotlight has come from
its bidding processes. Multiple states have experienced protracted, contentious
litigation over their bidding processes related to their Medicaid managed care
programs. Sagas in three states—West Virginia, Iowa, and Missouri—are
covered in depth below.
Frequently, courts have found that states’ bidding processes have been
appropriate, dismissing lawsuits brought by insurance company competitors

123. Schorsch, supra note 1.
124. Schorsch, supra note 122.
125. Schorsch, supra note 1 (“In 2014, just 8 percent of [Illinois’s] Medicaid recipients were in
managed care. Today, it’s 65 percent, and Rauner wants it closer to 80 percent.”); see also Schorsch,
supra note 122 (Seeking to grow the program geographically as well as numerically, “Rauner wants
to expand managed care services statewide and add another 15 percent of all Medicaid enrollees to
the program. In Central Illinois, for example, Medicaid recipients have little access to managed
care.”).
126. Schorsch, supra note 1 (noting that Illinois is looking at successful Medicaid managed
care plans in Arizona and Ohio).
127. Schencker, supra note 119.
128. Id.
129. See Lisa Schencker, Illinois Names 6 Insurers to Take Part in Overhauled Medicaid
Managed Care, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2017, 5:56 PM), www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-medi
caid-insurers-chosen-0813-biz-20170811-story.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2017); Rauner Vetoes
Medicaid Purchase Plan as Duplicative, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 13, 2017, 6:04 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/illinois/articles/2017-10-13/rauner-vetoes-medicaidpurchase-plan-as-duplicative (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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who lost out on winning the bid. For instance, last year in Nebraska, a court
found against Aetna Better Health of Nebraska and Arbor Health Plan, finding
no evidence that substantiated allegations that Nebraska’s bidding process was
unfair. 130
Ohio experienced a similar—but more unpredictable—Medicaid managed
care bidding dispute in 2012. First, in the early summer of 2012, Aetna was
granted a temporary injunction that ordered Ohio to “stop awarding new health
insurance contracts . . . because of alleged flaws in a bidding process.” 131
Specifically, Aetna successfully argued that Ohio Medicaid “officials ‘abused
their discretion when they revoked their previous award to Aetna of the contract
and refused Aetna the right of protest otherwise guaranteed to applicants’” for
purposes of granting a temporary injunction. 132 Further, another insurance
company and fellow bidder, Amerigroup, filed a lawsuit based on “alleged
unfairness in the evaluation of its Medicaid submission,” seeking a similar order
to mandate the “rescoring of all bids or a new start to the entire bidding
process.” 133
But just two months later, the same judge, the late Judge Richard Sheward,
reversed course. Specifically, he “lifted an injunction on the state’s awarding of
health insurance contracts under Medicaid and tossed Aetna Inc.’s lawsuit
alleging flawed bidding procedures, saying company officials lacked
credibility.” 134 Further, Judge Sheward “suggested Aetna intentionally misled

130. Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. v. Nebraska Dep’t of Admin. Servs., No.
4:16CV3094, 2016 WL 4435197, at *10 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2016); see also Riley Johnson, Aetna
Ends Court Fight with State Over Medicaid Plan, LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 26, 2016), http://journal
star.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/aetna-ends-court-fight-with-state-over-medi
caid-plan/article_90ae2bed-7208-5e5e-8b52-eff4c0304a2d.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017)
(Aetna was “alleging the award process was not open and fair to all bidders as required by Nebraska
law. But U.S. District Judge Robert Rossiter Jr. denied that request Aug. 19, saying Aetna’s legal
claims failed to show the need for the injunction they sought, which he called [an] ‘extraordinary
remedy.’”). Further, Aetna Better Health of Nebraska, United Healthcare, and Arbor Health are the
companies providing Medicaid and CHIP managed care in the state, but “[a]lmost everyone on
Medicaid or CHIP will be in Heritage Health,” a new plan that won the state bid. Molly McCleery,
What to Know About Big Changes to Medicaid in Nebraska, NEB. APPLESEED (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://neappleseed.org/blog/21020 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
131. Jeff Overley, Aetna Wins Halt of Ohio Medicaid Contracts, LAW360 (Jun. 27, 2012, 5:31
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/354450/aetna-wins-halt-of-ohio-medicaid-contracts.caidcontracts (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting the company as saying, “Amerigroup does not make the decision to pursue
legal remedies against a state partner lightly, [but] given the facts and circumstances associated
with the [bid] scoring, it has been deemed necessary to do so in this case”).
134. Jeff Overley, Slamming Aetna Execs, Judge Tosses Medicaid Contract Suit, LAW360
(Aug. 17, 2012, 1:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/370687/slamming-aetna-execs-judgetosses-medicaid-contract-suit (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (noting that the decision was a “striking
turnaround”).
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the state in its bid to land contracts, saying it was hard to fathom that highranking executives didn’t understand basic Medicaid guidelines.” 135 The judge
was particularly harsh on the executives, saying that Aetna’s leaders should have
known “they didn’t have a prayer” in their attempt to win the contract. 136 The
stinging decision gave Ohio the right to implement the new contracts, and it did
so in 2013. 137
Finally, in Kentucky in 2016, a settlement was reached between the state
and Centene, a Medicaid managed care administrator, for claims arising out of
its agreement to administer Kentucky’s Medicaid managed care contract. 138
Specifically, it was Centene’s subsidiary, Kentucky Spirit, that had been
awarded the contract but had alleged that the state did not adequately disclose
materially necessary information and provided inaccurate information related to
the state’s Medicaid managed care contract that covered 140,000
Kentuckians. 139
As a consequence, Kentucky Spirit canceled the contract a year early, after
only one year of plan administration. 140 The state then alleged that the contract
cancellation cost it between twenty-eight million and forty million dollars, and
sued. 141 After the trial and appellate courts found for the state, 142 the two sides
reached a settlement agreement in November of 2016 in which the state did not
have to pay any money. 143 In the settlement, both the state and the company
135. Id.
136. Id. (noting that the judge accused the leader of the Aetna Medicaid unit of being untruthful,
saying, “I don’t believe the testimony of these witnesses for a second that they didn’t know what
full risk meant . . . . I don’t believe Tom Kelly for a second. He knows what full risk is.”).
137. See Catherine Candisky, Judge Dismisses Aetna’s Lawsuit Challenging State Contracts
for Medicaid Program, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:58 PM), http://www.dispatch.
com/content/stories/local/2012/08/16/judge-upholds-state-contracts-Medicaid-Aetna-lawsuit.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (quoting the judge as saying, “I did not find that the state abused its
discretion at all . . . . Quite the contrary, I think Aetna came up with a new interpretation as to what
full risk is and I definitely did not accept that . . . . I thought it was unbelievable and frankly, I don’t
think half the Aetna people believed it but the higher ups felt if they didn’t do something creative
they had no chance . . . . I think they knew better.”).
138. See Erica Teichert, Centene and Kentucky Settle Medicaid Managed-Care Contract Spat,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161104/NEWS/
161109948 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
139. Id.; Samantha Liss, Centene Reaches Settlement with State of Kentucky, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/centene-reaches-settlementwith-state-of-kentucky/article_9611ac17-f58c-51cf-8085-ac6284d4c415.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2017); see also Claire Galofaro, Kentucky Spirit Loses Appeal in Medicaid Suit, COURIERJOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2015/02/06/
kentucky-spirit-loses-appeal-medicaid-suit/23000931/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
140. See Liss, supra note 139.
141. Teichert, supra note 138.
142. See Galofaro, supra note 139 (noting that the Kentucky Court of Appeals found “that the
company breached its contract and ordered that the state is entitled to damages”).
143. Teichert, supra note 138.
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“agree[d] that neither party acted in bad faith, that they took reasonable positions
in light of the applicable contractual language and that parties acted in good faith
in attempting to address a difficult situation,” according to a company
statement. 144
These recent occurrences—in Nebraska, Ohio, and Kentucky—highlight the
often highly contentious bidding process that occurs within the Medicaid
managed care program. Three additional states’ recent litigious pasts—those of
West Virginia, Iowa, and Missouri—are summarized immediately below.
A.

West Virginia

In West Virginia, five taxpaying citizens brought a lawsuit seeking to: (1)
review the state Medicaid managed care contracts with four insurance
companies from the summer of 2014 to the summer of 2015, and (2) enjoin the
state from implementing and operating under new Medicaid managed care
contracts in the summer of 2015. 145 The plaintiffs argued that the West Virginia
Bureau for Medical Services violated the state procurement laws based upon
legislation that was passed in 2013 and 2014 that clearly evinced the legislature’s
intent to have these contracts bid out competitively. 146 The plaintiffs were sure
to highlight that the failure to put the Medicaid managed care contracts to bid
resulted in a “significant negative impact to [the state’s] budget,” creating “a
substantial burden upon West Virginia taxpayers.” 147 According to the
plaintiffs:
In order to deliver Medicaid services through this program to eligible Medicaid
participants throughout West Virginia, the State enters into contracts with
Managed Care Organizations (“MCOs”) that in turn contract with health care
providers that treat the Medicaid beneficiaries. West Virginia law requires all
State agencies to award government contracts exclusively through a competitive
bidding process. In this case, Defendants have awarded large contracts under the

144. Id.
145. Complaint and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus at 3, 10, 13, Rucker v. W.
Va. Dep’t. of Admin., No. 15-C-1192 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 12, 2015) (“Defendants awarded, and
intend to award, managed care contracts to MCOs as part of West Virginia’s Medicaid program
without subjecting those MCOs or their proposed contracts to a process of competitive bidding.
Defendants awarded, and intend to award, those contracts, therefore, in violation of the West
Virginia Code and related regulations, which require the use of the competitive bidding process.”).
146. Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief at 2, Rucker v. W. Va. Dep’t. of Admin., No. 15-C786 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 24, 2015). Interestingly, the plaintiffs had standing to sue, claiming it
under State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsburg. Id. Ginsburg noted that when “an unsuccessful
bidder or a taxpayer” is challenging the award of a public contract in West Virginia, he or she “must
show fraud, collusion, or such an abuse of discretion that it is shocking to the conscience.” State ex
rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsburg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 620 (W. Va. 1979).
147. Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, supra note 146, at 5.
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State Medicaid program to a small group of MCOs without subjecting those
contracts to competitive bidding. 148

Further, the plaintiffs were not attempting to void the contracts but instead
sought an order demanding that the state put the contracts to a competitive bid. 149
Specifically, the plaintiffs were seeking to “enjoin Defendants’ longstanding
violation of West Virginia law in the awarding of the State’s managed care
contracts, a practice that has dramatically harmed the taxpayers of West
Virginia, failed to control healthcare costs, and netted profits for MCOs that
vastly outpace those of nearly every other state.” 150 Indeed, the lead plaintiff was
quoted as saying that “[t]he requirement for competitive bidding is common
sense” and noting that “[j]ust as the average citizen would not buy a car without
shopping around for the best deal, state government should not enter into
contracts without ensuring that taxpayers get the best deal possible.” 151
The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, for its part,
denied that its bidding processes violated any laws, and it also noted that under
the contractual system in place, its rates could not be decreased without violating
federal law. 152 Specifically, West Virginia had “an MLR rebate model” in the
contract that “would penalize the plans for not being able to maintain an MLR
of 85 percent or more.” 153 Plans that missed the MLR benchmark were required
to “rebate the state the difference,” leading the deputy secretary for public health
and insurance to assert that “the idea that competitive bidding would save the
state money ‘isn’t realistic’—plans would only submit capitation rates to the
state and not a projected MLR,” resulting in the state paying more without any
quality care guarantee. 154 Indeed, the state argued that because West Virginia
was at an “actuarial floor,” opening the process to a competitive bid may have

148. Complaint and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus, supra note 145, at 2.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Taxpayers File for Injunction over No-Bid Contracts in West Virginia’s Medicaid
Managed Care Program, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 26, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/taxpayers-file-for-injunction-over-no-bid-contracts-in-west-virginiasmedicaid-managed-care-program-300072143.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017). Ms. Rucker, the
lead plaintiff, was also quoted as saying the following: “Because Medicaid was not bidding out
these contracts, we were losing up to $100 million a year . . . . With this settlement, I think,
taxpayers are going to be gaining because we’re going to be saving money, it’s going to be a more
transparent system, and we’re going to be a lot more efficient.” Lydia Nuzum, WV DHHR Medicaid
Lawsuit Settlement Means HMO Contracts Must Be Bid Out, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov.
20, 2015, 2:11 PM), http://wvgazettemail34.rssing.com/chan-52375381/all_p59.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2017).
152. See Nuzum, supra note 151 (quoting the West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources deputy secretary for public health and insurance as saying “DHHR stands by the position
that its contracting practices for Medicaid managed care have complied with federal and state law”).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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resulted in a higher rate for the state, particularly if all the bids that were
submitted were higher than the state would have paid under the old regime. 155
Nonetheless, the circuit court judge noted that the West Virginia MCOs were
raking in “excessive profits.” 156 According to the petition, the West Virginia
Medicaid managed care companies were “realizing profits ranging from 8
percent to 13 percent, compared to a national average of 1.2 percent.” 157
Plaintiffs’ attorney Jesse Forbes quibbled with the state’s characterization
that the lawsuit was unnecessary. 158 He cited the possibility that an insurance
company could submit a bid that would be higher than the previous MLR
requirement. 159 Consequently, the litigation resulted in the possibility that the
state could save more money on its Medicaid managed care contracts. 160
Nonetheless, whether beneficial or not, by November of 2015, the targeted
state agencies settled the lawsuit with the taxpayer plaintiffs. 161 Under the
settlement, the West Virginia Bureau for Medical Services agreed to
competitively bid all Medicaid managed care contracts beginning in 2017. 162
The settlement also required that the Medicaid program heed all transparency
requirements and release annual performance summaries. 163 The eighty-five
percent MLR requirement is still in place under the settlement. 164

155. Id. (quoting Jeremiah Samples, the Department of Health and Human Resources deputy
secretary for public health and insurance as saying: “If a plan comes in and their proposed rate is
well below what an actuary will sign off on, an actuary wouldn’t sign the letter we submit to [the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services], and conversely, if they come in at a level that is above
the actuarial range, then the same situation would occur . . . . The risk in this entire process, and it’s
something we’ve said several times, is that, because we’ve been at the actuarial floor, if the plans
come in at a higher rate but are still within range, then we could see an increase in the cost of
managed care. The notion that there is going to be money saved through this process is—I just
don’t understand how people can come to that conclusion . . . .”).
156. Richard Stevens, DHHR Must Bid MCO Contracts, W. VA. PHARMACISTS ASS’N (Dec.
29, 2015), http://wvpharmacy.org/2015/12/dhhr-must-bid-mco-contracts/ (last visited Sept. 13,
2017).
157. Id.
158. See Nuzum, supra note 151.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See Nuzum, supra note 151; see also Brooke Murphy, West Virginia Medicaid Program
Settles Lawsuit Over Managed Care Contracts, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/west-virginia-medicaid-programsettles-lawsuit-over-managed-care-contracts.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
164. Nuzum, supra note 151; Murphy, supra note 163.
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Iowa

When it comes to the switch to Medicaid managed care, perhaps no state has
been as politically volatile and legally salacious as has Iowa. 165 The most
explosive allegations were lobbed—specifically that the entire bidding process
was “riddled with errors and nepotism,” according to court allegations—during
a lawsuit brought by Medicaid managed care providers Aetna, Meridian, and
Iowa Total after they lost the Iowa bid. 166
Plaintiffs in the lawsuit alleged that WellCare—one of four companies that
ultimately received the Iowa Medicaid managed care contracts (agreements that
ultimately “manage the program that provides health care to 560,000
Iowans”) 167—made inappropriate inquiries of state officials. According to
litigation reports, the plaintiffs alleged that WellCare “asked two former state
lawmakers for assistance in determining who was on the committee that would
be evaluating the bids and how it might influence their decisions,” and the
lawmakers allegedly responded. 168 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that WellCare
was in contact with members of Governor Terry Branstad’s staff during the bid
“blackout” period. 169
The state “acknowledged” that the alleged communications of an insurance
company official and former state lawmaker with a Department of Human
Services consultant did take place “during a critical review period” and were
improper, but maintained that the communications “had no bearing on Iowa’s
selection of four companies that [were] in line to manage the state’s Medicaid

165. See Editorial: Connecticut Abandoned Privatized Medicaid, supra note 107; see also
Jason Clayworth, Did Politics Taint Iowa Medicaid Bid Process?, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 29,
2015, 8:51 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investigations/2015/10/29/did-pol
itics-taint-iowa-medicaid-bid-process/74799352/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (“A private company
that ultimately won a contract to help manage Iowa’s $4.2 billion Medicaid program asked two
former state lawmakers for assistance in determining who was on the committee that would be
evaluating the bids and how it might influence their decisions, according to evidence presented in
court on Thursday.”).
166. Clayworth, supra note 165 (“The evidence was submitted as part of a legal challenge from
three companies—Aetna, Meridian and Iowa Total—who were not among those chosen to get the
lucrative state contracts and who claim the public bid process behind the largest government
privatization effort in state history was riddled with errors and nepotism.”); accord Sarah Boden,
Aetna, WellCare and DHS Spar Over Medicaid Implementation Progress, IOWA PUB. RADIO (Jan.
14, 2016), http://iowapublicradio.org/post/aetna-wellcare-and-dhs-spar-over-medicaid-implemen
tation-progress#stream/0 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (“Aetna attorney Mark Weinhardt told the
court the state’s evaluation process was ‘fatally flawed,’ due in part to the state’s rush to make a
selection. He says the ‘irrationality of the scoring process’ was an abuse of discretion by the
selection committee.”).
167. Clayworth, supra note 165.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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program.” 170 During the litigation, evidence of a “more extensive network of
communications between former lawmakers, sitting legislators, the governor’s
staff and companies vying for lucrative contracts” to administer the Medicaid
managed care contract was made public. 171 Repeatedly, the insurance companies
that had lost the bid with the state used state emails to allege improper
communications. 172
Some of the allegations against WellCare led to the cancellation of the
contract with the state but did not result in the losing bidders being awarded the
contract. Indeed, in late 2015, an Iowa administrative judge suggested that
“WellCare’s contract be tossed out, citing improper communications between
WellCare and state employees” and a failure to disclose both details surrounding
a corporate integrity agreement 173 and “information regarding $137.5 million in
fines to resolve false claims litigation.” 174 WellCare appealed the administrative
judge’s decision in early 2016, noting that it had provided additional, clarifying
information in response to questions from the state and arguing that state rules
that prevented conversations during an RFP were unclear and vague. 175
However, the district court judge upheld the administrative judge’s decision,
and WellCare dropped the appeal in mid-February 2016. 176 According to reports
surrounding the case, the judge noted that there was “‘substantial evidence’ to
support the assertion that WellCare failed to disclose information in its bid,
170. Jason Clayworth, Iowa DHS: Medicaid Director’s Private Email ‘Improper,’ DES
MOINES REG. (Oct. 26, 2015, 7:22 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investiga
tions/2015/10/26/iowa-dhs-medicaid-directors-private-email-improper/74640246/ (last visited
Sept. 13, 2017) (“Schulte [the state lawmaker-turned consultant] posted a response to social media
shortly after the state selected the winning companies stating that she helped WellCare with its bid,
which raised questions about whether she provided the company unfair or insider information.”).
171. Jason Clayworth, Medicaid Communications Frequent During “Blackout” Time, DES
MOINES REG. (Oct. 30, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investiga
tions/2015/10/30/medicaid-communications-frequent-during-blackout-time/74898374/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2017) (“The emails presented as evidence show WellCare representatives floated
specific questions about the work through Michael Bousselot, Branstad’s policy director for human
services at the time of the communications with Rants. Bousselot was promoted on July 30 to be
the governor’s chief of staff. Attorneys for the plaintiffs contend the communications with
Bousselot—frequently referred to simply as MB in the emails—may have given the company a
fraudulent edge to win one of the four coveted contracts.”).
172. See id.
173. Chelsea Keenan, WellCare to Drop Appeals of Iowa Medicaid Contract After Judge’s
Ruling, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (Feb. 16, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/
news/health/district-judge-affirms-iowas-decision-to-toss-out-wellcare-medicaid-contract-201
60215 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
174. Chelsea Keenan, WellCare Appeals to District Judge to Keep Iowa Medicaid Contract,
CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (Feb. 1, 2016, 6:59 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/life/health/
health-care/medicaid/wellcare-appeals-to-district-judge-to-keep-iowa-medicaid-contract-201
60201 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
175. Id.
176. Keenan, supra note 173.
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including the ‘true extent’ of false claims litigations and details of a corporate
integrity agreement.” 177 The litigation effectively ended WellCare’s challenge,
and the company noted that it was time “to move forward,” according to the
company’s senior vice president, chief legal and administrative officer. 178
But the companies that lost the original Medicaid managed care bid did not
reap the benefits of WellCare’s exclusion. Meridian Health Plans had its
challenge denied, with the judge finding the review “scoring and evaluation to
be adequate and logical.” 179 Aetna, which sought to “throw out all . . . winning
bids” and “freeze . . . future actions in the privatization plan,” ultimately did not
have its delay request granted. 180
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the transition to Medicaid managed
care has proceeded smoothly. The initial date of privatization, January 1, 2016,
was delayed in December of 2015 by sixty days after CMS noted that it was
concerned about a lack of high-quality care and a risk of serious disruptions for
beneficiaries. 181 According to critics of privatization, including the Iowa
Hospital Association, the delay highlighted the haphazard and hasty shift by
state administration officials. 182 CMS delayed the move for a second time in late
February, approving privatization on April 1, instead of March 1, noting that the
new date “provide[d] additional time for Iowa to complete activities.” 183
Accordingly, on April 1, 2016, Iowa began its privatized Medicaid managed
care program, with Amerigroup Iowa, AmeriHealth Caritas Iowa, and
UnitedHealthcare of the River Valley serving as plan administrators. 184
But criticism has continued. 185 By the summer of 2016, providers and
equipment companies reported that new Medicaid managed care administrators

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Jason Clayworth, Companies Challenge Iowa’s Medicaid Recommendation, DES MOINES
REG. (Dec. 2, 2015, 10:25 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/health/2015/12/02/
companies-challenge-iowas-medicaid-recommendation/76687684/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
181. Tony Leys, Feds Tell Iowa: Delay Medicaid Privatization by 60 Days, DES MOINES REG.
(Dec. 17, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/12/17/feds
-tell-iowa-delay-medicaid-privatization-60-days/77495488/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
182. See id.
183. Chelsea Keenan, Feds Delay Start of Iowa Medicaid Changes to April 1, SIOUX CITY J.
(Feb. 23, 2016), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/feds-delay-start-ofiowa-medicaid-changes-to-april/article_4e5a058d-a2fe-51b2-a19e-3138656afabf.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2017) (noting also that the state had made progress since December of 2015).
184. See Chelsea Keenan, Iowa Moves Medicaid over to Managed Care, CEDAR RAPIDS
GAZETTE (Apr. 3, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/health/iowa-movesmedicaid-over-to-managed-care-20160403 (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (noting the challenges
facing the system with a new private administrator).
185. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

MANAGING MEDICAID

135

were not paying enough for needed services and products. 186 In a 2016 survey,
the majority of survey respondents “said they have received lower
reimbursement rates than what [was] stated in their contracts,” and “almost 80
percent said they [were] not getting paid on time.” 187 In August 2016, two of the
state’s three Medicaid administrators claimed tens of millions of dollars in
deficits. 188 By autumn of that year, the state was injecting tens of millions of
dollars more into the program by increasing payment rates, 189 and newspapers
still reported that the “payment shortages [were] ‘catastrophic’” and “not
acceptable.” 190 By the end of 2016, Iowa’s Medicaid administrators had “lost
hundreds of millions of dollars on the project”—with the three companies
claiming a combined loss of more than $500 million. 191 The companies also
criticized a “lack of transparency” in the process, claiming that the state’s
Medicaid managed care “rate development process [was] not actuarially
sound.” 192
In early 2017, modifications to the program continued. In March 2017, it
was reported that the Iowa Department of Human Services was establishing a

186. See Chelsea Keenan, Medicaid Payment Challenges Still Plaguing Iowa Health Care
Providers, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (Aug. 7, 2016, 1:00 AM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/
news/health/medicaid-payment-challenges-still-plaguing-iowa-health-care-providers-20160807
(last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (“Under the fee-for-service system, Iowa Medicaid reimbursed the
company for 85 percent of the suggested retail price on a wheelchair . . . . But under managed care,
the MCOs are only paying for 10 percent to 50 percent of the retail price.”).
187. Id.
188. Sarah McCarthy, Millions Owed to Iowa Medicaid Providers, According to State Reports,
KCRG-TV9 (Aug. 23, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://www.kcrg.com/content/news/Millions-owed-toIowa-Medicaid-providers-according-to-state-reports-391085411.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017)
(AmeriHealth Caritas Iowa reported a deficit of more than $42.6 million, with Amerigroup Iowa
reporting a $66.7 million deficit).
189. William Petroski & Tony Leys, Branstad Pumps $33 Million More into Medicaid
Privatization, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 31, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/politics/2016/10/31/branstad-pumps-33-million-more-into-medicaid-privatization/930
52804/ (last visited Sept.13, 2017) (reporting the governor said that the program was “more
efficient than expected so the state will still meet its goal of $110 million annually in projected
Medicaid cost savings”).
190. Tony Leys, Iowa Medicaid Payment Shortages are ‘Catastrophic,’ Private Managers Tell
State, DES MOINES REG. (Dec. 21, 2016, 6:27 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.
com/story/news/health/2016/12/21/iowa-medicaid-payment-shortages-catastrophic-private-man
agers-tell-state/95697880/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (“The for-profit companies running Iowa’s
Medicaid program have been complaining to state administrators that the controversial project is
‘drastically underfunded’ and that the situation has been a ‘catastrophic experience,’ newly released
documents show.”).
191. Id.; accord Chelsea Keenan, Iowa Offers Medicaid Insurers a Hand When It Comes to
Losses, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (Mar. 24, 2017, 8:04 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/
news/health/iowa-offers-medicaid-insurers-a-hand-when-it-comes-to-losses-20170324 (last
visited Sept. 13, 2017).
192. Leys, supra note 190.
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risk corridor to protect the administrators of the Medicaid private plans from
debilitating losses. 193 The risk corridor program was priced at about $10 million
to the state, but the federal government’s share—set to be paid in fiscal year
2019—could be more than $200 million. 194 The move to managed care
continues to be characterized as “highly contentious,” 195 with former Iowa
Governor Terry Branstad claiming that the Medicaid privatization has saved the
state $110 million. 196
C. Missouri
In 2012, Missouri had its own contentious litigation. Molina Healthcare, one
of the bidders for Missouri’s Medicaid managed care contract, alleged that the
state “changed the rules in the midst of a competitive bidding process” and also
alleged political favoritism, which violated the state competitive bidding law. 197
In the bidding process, Missouri had limited the number of contracts it was
awarding from five to three (in an effort to achieve increased leverage with more
members per plan). 198 Molina had been in the Missouri market since 2007, but
the state awarded the new contract to newcomer Centene, in addition to
others. 199
After Molina Healthcare began raising questions, the Missouri Office of
Administration responded that there was a “competitive bid process for the
managed care contract” and that “[p]oints were awarded for each bid based on
quality; the method of performance; organizational experience; and most

193. See Keenan, supra note 191.
194. Tony Leys, Exclusive: Feds’ Tab Could Hit $225 Million to Help Medicaid Firms Cover
Iowa Losses, DES MOINES REG. (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:47 AM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/health/2017/03/29/exclusive-feds-tab-could-hit-225-million-help-medicaid-firmscover-iowa-losses/99756352/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
195. Mary Caffrey, GAO Reports on the Benefits of Being a Medicaid Managed Care Official,
AJMC (May 1, 2017), http://www.ajmc.com/focus-of-the-week/0517/medicaid-managed-careofficials-earn-more-than-medicaid-directors-but-have-easier-jobs-gao-finds (last visited Sept. 13,
2017) (stating that Iowa “has seen a highly contentious transition to Medicaid managed care”).
196. Chelsea Keenan, Managed Care Year One: The Iowa Medicaid Program Sees Successes,
and Continued Challenges, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (Apr. 1, 2017, 11:27 AM), http://www.the
gazette.com/subject/news/health/managed-care-year-one-the-medicaid-program-sees-successesand-continued-challenges-04012017 (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
197. Elana Gordon, Lawsuit Challenges Medicaid Managed Care Decision in Missouri,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 9, 2012), http://khn.org/news/missouri-medicaid-managed-carelawsuit/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2017); see also Jason Hancock, Missouri Medicaid Faces Lawsuit
from Molina Healthcare, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 10, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.kansas
city.com/news/local/article302261/Missouri-Medicaid-faces-lawsuit-from-Molina-Health
care.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
198. Gordon, supra note 197.
199. See id.
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importantly, access to care.” 200 But the Kansas City Star reported that Centene
was a “major donor” to Governor Jay Nixon, and the House Government
Oversight and Accountability Committee said there were “serious questions
about the [contract bidding] process.” 201 According to the report, Centene
allegedly made a number of political donations to those in power, including
Governor Nixon and his campaign. 202
By May 2012, however, Molina’s lawsuit had been dismissed. 203 Judge B.C.
Drumm Jr. of the Cole County Circuit Court found that Molina did not object
until it found it was not rewarded with the contract and that it was not the
highest-rated company for quality metrics when it was reviewed in 2006 and
2009. 204 As a result, coupled with challenges in other states, Molina saw its stock
drop precipitously. 205
VI. LOOKING FORWARD: COST AND ACCESS
After all of the stories featuring challenges and opportunities for Medicaid
managed care, health policy analyses often come down to cost and access. A
quick glance at the scorecard and challenges for Medicaid managed care on these
points follows immediately follow.
First, on the cost front, conclusions on whether Medicaid managed care
saves money for states have been “mixed.” 206 For instance, in Florida, moving
from traditional Medicaid to managed care has reportedly reduced hospital costs
between seven and twelve percent. 207 Additionally, Ohio and Arizona have
200. Id.; accord Jason Hancock, Missouri Medicaid Faces Lawsuit from Molina Healthcare,
KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 10, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article302261/
Missouri-Medicaid-faces-lawsuit-from-Molina-Healthcare.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2017)
(“Molina . . . questioned how they scored so poorly in relation to access to care, yet were beat out
for the contract by Centene—which currently has no network of doctors and hospitals in the
state. ’More shocking than the results (of the bidding process) was the fact that Molina’s existing
network and proud record of quality and performance had been adjudged inferior to plans with no
network and no relevant Missouri experience,’ Molina said . . . . ‘Such results, so completely out
of step with history and present practice, are necessarily suspect and merit a close review.’”).
201. Hancock, supra note 200.
202. Id. (noting that Centene donated to the Democratic Governors’ Association, Governor
Nixon’s campaign, the state attorney general, and the state auditor).
203. See Jim Doyle, Judge Dismisses Missouri Medicaid Lawsuit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(May 11, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/judge-dismisses-missouri-medicaid-law
suit/article_2ce3424a-9bb7-11e1-bb60-001a4bcf6878.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
204. Id.
205. Esha Dey & Balaji Sridharan, Molina Shares Drop on Margin Squeeze in Texas, REUTERS
(June 7, 2012, 8:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-molina-shares-idUSBRE8560QM201
20607 (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
206. R. Cauchi, Medicaid and Managed Care, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Oct. 12, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medicaid-and-managed-care.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
207. Jessica Van Parys, How Do Managed Care Plans Reduce Healthcare Costs? 3 (Columbia
Univ., Working Paper, 2014), http://www.columbia.edu/~jnv2106/jvanparys.jmp.pdf.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

138

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:107

reportedly been successful in saving money in the switch to privatization. 208
According to reporting:
In Arizona, Medicaid officials estimate they saved nearly $29.5 billion over the
last five years by outsourcing the bulk of their enrollees’ health care to private
insurers.
Ohio did the same thing, and the results are promising. From 2009 to 2013, it
slowed the growth of costs in its $25 billion Medicaid program from 9 percent
to 3 percent. Annual spending has remained relatively flat ever since. 209

Health insurance trade groups are also quick to trumpet the savings; according
to another study, managed care capitation rates were about ten percent lower
than traditional fee-for-service payments in Ohio (according to the health
insurance industry) 210 and will save Texas about four billion dollars in six years
(also according to the health insurance industry). 211
Nonetheless, other studies seem to echo the findings that on cost savings,
managed care has been mixed. According to key findings from a 2012 Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation study: “There is little evidence of national savings
from Medicaid managed care, but a few states have had some success. The states
that did realize cost savings were more likely to be states with relatively high
reimbursement rates under fee-for-service.” 212 Thus, whether or not Medicaid
managed care is saving taxpayers substantial money remains a somewhat open
question, one that will likely be informed with more data as an increasing
number of beneficiaries enroll in Medicaid managed care.
Second, following the release of the new Medicaid managed care regulations
in 2016, Professor Sara Rosenbaum identified challenges that continue to face
the program. 213 These included challenges surrounding access, eligibility and
enrollment, payment incentives for reimbursement, alignment with other social
supports, and information technology. 214 Indeed, even given a number of robust

208. See Schorsch, supra note 1.
209. Id.
210. OHIO ASS’N OF HEALTH PLANS, THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY ON PUBLIC HEALTH
CARE: HOW MANAGED CARE IS RESHAPING MEDICAID IN OHIO 7 (2017), https://oahp.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/02/The-Impact-of-Private-Industry-on-Public-Health-Care.pdf.
211. Study Reveals Cost-Saving Benefits of Medicaid Managed Care, TEX. ASS’N OF HEALTH
PLANS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://tahp.org/study-reveals-cost-saving-benefits-of-medicaid-managedcare/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
212. M. Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Sept. 2012),
http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2012/09/medicaid-managed-care.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2017).
213. See Sara Rosenbaum, The Medicaid Managed Care Rule: The Major Challenges States
Face, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 6, 2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/
blog/2016/may/the-medicaid-managed-care-rule (last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
214. See id.
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access standards at the state level, 215 access to quality care remains a potent
policy challenge facing Medicaid managed care. The challenge of access is often
particularly dire in underserved and rural areas, where hospitals are less likely
to join a managed care market because of less competitive marketplaces. 216
Further, oversight challenges also impact access to care. 217 Often
complicated by a lack of information or incomplete information, Medicaid
managed care beneficiaries can often have a difficult time accessing care, even
when it is offered and available. According to a recent study by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General
(OIG):
Fifty-one percent of providers could not offer appointments because they were
not participating at the listed location . . . or were not accepting new patients
enrolled in the plan. This means that Medicaid managed care enrollees may not
be able to make appointments with as many as half of the providers listed by
their plans. 218

Finally, as aforementioned, some states’ access to care standards are robust,
but they are tremendously varied. 219 This has led the OIG to recommend that
215. See Medicaid MCO Access Standards: Primary Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2013),
http://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/medicaid-mco-access-standards-primary-care/?current
Timeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
(last visited Aug. 27, 2017).
216. See, e.g., Virgil Dickson, Central Illinois Facing Medicaid Network Adequacy ‘Crisis,’
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170214/NEWS
/170219955 (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) (noting that “in more urban areas, the competition is so
stiff that hospitals risk losing out on patients if they don’t join a managed care network”).
217. See Phil Galewitz, 5 Challenges Facing Medicaid at 50, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July
30, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/30/5-challenges-facing-med
icaid-at-50 (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) (noting a 2014 report that “found widespread inaccuracies
in Medicaid managed care plans’ provider directories,” and that “[h]alf of the doctors listed in the
directories were unavailable because providers were not at that location, were not in the plan’s
network or were no longer taking new patients”); see also DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ACCESS TO CARE: PROVIDER AVAILABILITY IN MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE 13 (Dec. 2014), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-13-00670.pdf.
218. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 217, at 8; accord Simon Basseyn &
Karin Rhodes, Ongoing Challenges in Access to Care in Medicaid Managed Care, PA. UNIV.,
LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECONS., (Dec. 12, 2014) https://ldi.upenn.edu/ongoingchallenges-access-care-medicaid-managed-care (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) (noting that the report
and previous studies seem to indicate “the lower willingness of some providers to see new Medicaid
patients in order to maintain a desired payer-mix, even among providers who participate in MMC
plans”).
219. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., STATE STANDARDS
FOR ACCESS TO CARE IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 8–12 (2014), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/
oei-02-11-00320.pdf (noting that the majority of states “limit the distance or time enrollees should
have to travel to see a provider,” that “appointments be provided within a certain timeframe,” and
that “[t]wenty [s]tates require a minimum number of providers based on the number of enrollees”).
Still, as noted, “these standards vary considerably—from 1 primary care provider for every 100
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CMS “strengthen its oversight” of states’ access standards. 220 Needless to say,
access remains a chief challenge for Medicaid managed care going into the
future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a time of pervasive uncertainty and high anxiety surrounding the
American health care system, Medicaid managed care continues its expansion
and evolution, championed by states that have seen costs drop and access rise.
But challenges remain. Chief among them, states must successfully navigate the
often complicated and politically sensitive procurement process in awarding
Medicaid bids and successfully tackle access problems. Indeed, Medicaid
managed care may not be a panacea to what ails state budgets, but its continued
adoption nationwide seems unrelenting. Whether its expanded implementation
will ultimately pay off remains complicated in the midst of a uniquely
unpredictable era in American health care.

enrollees to 1 for every 2,500 enrollees.” Id. at 10. Still other states limit in-office wait time, provide
access to multilingual care, provide telephonic access to providers, and “incorporate[] . . .
performance measures into its access standards,” like, for example, “requir[ing] that 83 percent of
enrollees 1 to 19 years old have had a primary care visit within the previous year.” Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 19.

